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New Societies Law threatens future 
of many NGOs 
A new law on social organisations, the Societies Law ( Undang-
Undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan) , which is now before the 
Indonesian Parliament, will have the effect of bringing every 
single organisation in the coun_try under the direct control of the 
government and of compelling them all to give unreserved 
support to government policies. The draft law is one of five bills 
tabled by the government in June, for adoption by Parliament at 
its next session which starts in August. With all members of 
Parliament either hand-picked by the ' ~resident or screened by 
the Interior Minister before their names could enter the electoral 
lists, there is no doubt whatever that the bills will be 
unanimously adopted. 
The Societies Law will standardise and regulate a vast array 
of organisations which have come to be referred to broadly ,as 
"non-government organisations" (NGOs). All will be required 
to adopt Pancasila, the state dqgma of five principles, as their 
sole basis and principle (azas tunggal). 
In t.he past decade or so, many NGOs have come into 
existence as an expression of frustration and dissatisfaction with 
the political party system which has been totally domesticated to 
conform with the demands of the military rulers. The parties 
consist of GOLKAR, the government party controlled by the 
military, plus the PPP (Muslim) and the PDI (Nationalist and 
Christian) both of which are heavily infiltrated by the military 
and do not deviate any more from government policies. 
Broadly speaking, the Societies Law will regulate four types 
of organisations: 
- So-called "mass" organisations of workers , peasants , 
fishermen, women and the like. In fact, in all these sectors, 
single organisations now exist which comply with the military 
requirement for harmony and consensus and have no mass basis 
at all. They are nothing more. than "empty houses" or "shop 
fronts" which have no relevance to the pressing needs of 
Indonesian people working (or not working) in various sectors of 
the economy. These organisations have nothing to fear from the 
new legislation; indeed , they epitomise the end result intended · 
for the other NGOs. 
-Religious organisations connected with the Protestant and 
Catholic churches, with Islam, and with the other two state-
recognised religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. These are 
organisations which enjoy large followings. 
-Professional organisations of lawyers, doctors, scientists and 
so on , some of which have until now been relatively free from 
government intervention . 
-A number of small NGOs set up to campaign on issues like 
environmental pollution , consumer protection , the promotion of 
intermediate technology, legal aid and human rights . These 
organisations have tried to use the little space still available, in 
some cases to very good effect. 
Azas Tunggal 
The compulsory adoption of Pancasila as the sole basis (azas 
tunggal) for every organisation is presenting religious 
organisations with a severe dilemma. At its conference last year , 
the Muslim students organisation, HMI refused to accept the 
"sole-ideology" requirement despite strong pre-5sure from the 
Minister of Youth Affairs who attended the meeting. At the 
time, the HMI argued that it would not accept azas tunggal as the 
Societies Law had not yet been enacted, and the government was 
prepared to let the matter rest for the time being. 
Leaders of both Protestant and Catholic churches have 
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Societies' Law 
spoke~ of their anxiety over possible implications of the new 
Law'. m se~arate interviews with Sinar Harapan (18 June 1984). 
The mterv1ews suggest that the Catholics are more upset about 
the law. than the . Protestants. Th~" General Secretary of the 
Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI), Or S.A.E . Nababan, 
said that the Church is the creation of God, not of people, and 
cannot be regulated by temporal power. Mgr Leo Soekoto, the 
Secretary of the. Indonesian Bishops Conference (MA WI), said 
that c~urch. ~odies have Christianity as the basis for every facet 
of their act1v1ty. "Where must we now put our religion? Will it 
not mean replacing our religious beliefs with the Pancasila?" The 
government o~ten claims that it does not want to replace religion 
by the Pancas1la, but what we wan,t, said Mgr Soekoto is a firm 
guarantee in the ~aw. itself that religion will be allowed ~o inspire 
all ~h.urc~ or~amsat10nal and community activity, as well as 
part1c1pahon m national and state affairs . He wanted to know 
whether MA WI would now fall under the terms of the new law. 
MA WI is part of the Church structure regulated by the Vatican. 
Its members-:--the Bishops-are appointed by the Pope. The 
many. Catholic orders are similarly part of international 
establishments and they, like charismatic organisations exist 
solely to serve religious purposes. If such organisations ;r~ not 
ex~licitly. excluded from the Law, they could find themselves 
bemg subject to government control (under Article 12) and could 
even be disbanded by the government (Article 15), said Mgr 
Soekoto. 
Strict adherence to government policy 
Other NGOs which by and large have no particular 
ideol.ogical tende,ncy are not so troubled by the azas tunggal 
:eqmr~ment; many probably already pay lip-service to Pancasila 
m t.heir statu.tes. What troubles them is that they will now be 
subject to dJrect government control and intervention. The 
leadership o~ ~n NGO can be "frozen" (dibekukan) by the 
govern~ent 1f 1t "engages in activities that disturb security and 
the pubhc order'. accepts funds from abroad without government 
conse~t, or provides assistance to foreign groups in ways harmful 
to natlo~al ~nd state i~terests". (Article 13). Any organisation 
that persists m such anti-government pursuits after its leadership 
has been "froz~n". will be .dissolved by the government (Article 
14). An orga?1sat1on can m any case be banned without going 
through the ngmarole of "freezing" the leadership. 
As a means of making government intervention and control 
far m?re. effective, the law requires that all organisations 
op~ratmg m t~e same area of activity must come together within 
a smg~e orga~1sation. This is precisely the tactic already used so 
~ffectJvel~ with trade unions, the peasant organisations, and 
mdeed with the polit~cal pa~tie~ that were all forced to merge in 
th~ ear~y 1970s. The Journalists organisation, PWI, the only one 
of its kmd, has been under tight military control for many years. 
Now, laywers' organisations are under pressure to create a 
"single vehicle", ."'.ith the Min~ster of Justice playing the leading 
role. The move 1s clearly designed to eliminate the role of the 
~ar Association (Peradin) which has so far preserved its 
md_ependence f~om th~ g~wernment: As p_art of the process, 
splinter lawyers organisations came mto bemg which have now 
be~n able to insist on a say in the merger process, in other words 
domg the government's bidding and making the merger appea; 
to have grass-roots support. · 
Financial control 
Besides arming the government with powers to ban 
organi_satio°:s, the new La~ makes it obligatory for all foreign 
financial assistance to obtam government approval. This method 
of control is certain to be used to prevent organisations from 
engaging in any act,!vities not to th~ government's likiµg. Most 
~G~s are not large . m~mbership organisations; they are 
mst1tutes or campaigmng committees which assume 
responsibility for activities that are often varied and costly. A 
prime example is the Legal Aid Institutes which, among other . 
things provide free legal aid or defence, and also run training or 
advisory schemes to increase people's awareness of their legal 
rights and the ways to uphold these rights without necessarily 
going to court. Funding from abroad, through private channels 
has become important, but the new law will prevent funds from 
going to any organisation engaged in activities that do not meet 
with the. government's approval. 
NGOs will also be required to confine themselves to a one-
dimensional approach with the government being the arbiter in 
determining whether such narrow constrictions are breached. 
Government control will be exerted through the Minister 
directly concerned with the area of operations of the NGO in 
question. Government control will thus be not simply a question 
of registration and de-registration; it will involve direct and 
continuous supervision over all NGOs. 
With . control over so many aspects of life already so tight, 
Indonesia's military rulers appear to have opted for a rather 
gradual approach in their latest move to eliminate all remaining 
independent organisational activity. The Societies Law will give 
existing organisations a transitional period of two years ti:> bring 
themselves into line with the provisions of the law. By 1986, 
Indonesia's model of total conformity and the annihilation of the 
last remaining centres of criticism, will be in place. 
The other bills 
The four other bills tabled in the single packet of legislation 
prepared by the government involve the general elections, the 
political parties, Parliament and the "People's Assembly" 
(MPR) and a referendum requirement for any constitutional 
amendment. These bills represent little more than a tidying up of 
existing legislation which already safeguards the regime against 
any challenge to its rule. The new law on the political parties will 
only introduce the requirement that parties bring themselves 
into line with the azas tunggal principle. Both PPP and POI have 
in fact already done so. The new law on Parliament and the MPR 
increases the number of seats in these two rubber-stamp bodies 
to 500 and a thousand respectively and provides for 100 and 200 
presidentially-appointed representatives from the Armed Forces 
instead of the 75 and 150 seats they now hold. The referendum 
bill is simply a device to make any amendment to the 
Constitution even less likely than it now is. 
Internal exile law 
The five bills before Parliament do not include the internal 
exile law, the draft of which was leaked last year (see TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 61, January 1984). The Armed Forces have 
apparently decided to keep this particularly repressive piece of 
legislation for the next round of parliamentary business, after the 
azas tunggal principle has been established by law. The internal 
exile legislation will grant extra-judicial powers to the president 
to order people into exile for up to ten years, without any 
recourse to the courts, if he regards them as detrimental to state 
interests. Internal exile was widely practised against tens of 
thousands of political prisoners held without charge or trial for 
alleged "communist sympathies" in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
new law will make literally anyone subject to such arbitrary 
exile. 
From Indonesia Under the Jackboot (1979) 
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West Papua 
The killing of Arnold Ap and Eddy Mofu 
Arnold Ap, curator of the Anthropological Museum in Jayapura 
and leader of the Mambesak West Papuan Arts Group, was 
killed by Indonesian security forces at the end of April (see 
TAPOL Bulletin 63, May 1984). His funeral, though screened by 
Indonesian intelligence, was attended by over one thousand 
people, evidence of his extraordinary popularity and the great 
respect for a person who sought to preserve Papuan culture in 
the face of Indonesia's destructive policies. 
It has now become clear that from the time of his arrest up to 
his death, Arnold was the victim of a long catalogue of legal 
abuses. Virtually every aspect of his detention was in violation of 
the Indonesian procedural code (KUHAP), and his death has 
received no official explanation from the Indonesian 
Government, although the circumstances surrounding it give 
grounds to believe he was deliberately killed by the Indonesian 
Armed Forces. 
Arnold Ap was arrested on 30 November 1983 (see TAPOL 
Bulletin 61, January 1984), and detained by KOPASSANDHA 
(para-commandos) at its Panorama Detention Centre in 
Jayapura. He was not charged with any offence, his family were 
not told of his whereabouts, and he had been arrested by the 
military, all of which contravened the procedural code. His case 
attracted the attention of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), which 
protested about the legal irregularities, and the newspaper Sinar 
Harapan also reported details of his arrest. The Government 
reacted by severely reprimanding the paper, a veiled threat of 
complete closure, while KOPASSANDHA intensified its 
interrogation of Arnold in an attempt to discover who was 
informing the press about his case. The publicity may have had 
some positive effect, however, because on 20 January 1984, 
Arnold and four other KOPASSANDHA detainees were 
transferred to the Irian Jaya Police Command, under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial Chief of Police. Then, on 25 
February, their case was put into the hands of the Public 
Prosecutor's Office . This should have meant that Arnold's case 
would go before the court, or that he would be released within 50 
days, according to the procedural code. Neither of these things 
happened. 
Arnold remained in police custody until his death. There 
have been different accounts of what happened to him and his 
four companions between the time they were last seen in prison 
and the discovery of Arnold's body. The most improbable 
explanation comes from Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, who protested angrily over letters of concern 
over Arnold Ap's death by a number of Australian academics 
who normally support Jakarta's line . Mochtar said Arnold had 
been killed in a shoot-out at sea (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
June), and claimed his information came from the highly 
unlikely source of the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta. 
According to Moch tar, the five men had escaped from prison 
with the help of a guard . But Alex Mebri, the only one of the five 
who escaped and reached PNG, says they were all taken out of 
prison in a military vehicle, from which he was able to jump 
while being taken to what he assumed later to have been their 
place of execution. It is not yet certain exactly what happened, 
but on 23 April Eddy Mofu's body was found, bruised and 
disfigured, washed up on a beach near Jayapura. On 26 April , 
Arnold's body was discovered at the Aryoko Hospital in 
Jayapura by a Papuan employee there. His body was also 
bruised, and there were three bullet wounds in the stomach. The 
other two men, Johannes Rumainum and Augustinus Runtuboi, 
were recaptured (it now appears that Rumainum was not killed, 
as reported in TAPOL Bulletin 63). Rumainum is being held in 
police custody, and the military have paraded Runtuboi around 
in front of students at Cendrawasih University to give their 
version of the killings. 
Arnold's wife and family did not attend his funeral, as they 
were among the first people to flee to Papua New Guinea. He 
did not manage to get the legal aid he needed in Jayapura, 
because of the flight of local lawyers to PNG. The whole tragic 
episode of Arnold's imprisonment and death has made one point 
clear to West Papuans-that the Indonesian military dispenses 
with all humanitarian and legal standards as a matter of routine, 
whether it be to eliminate OPM sympathisers, or to silence 
someone who, more than anyone else, personified Papuan 
cultural and national aspirations. This can only harden the 
attitude of Papuans towards increasingly repressive rule by 
Indonesia. 
LBH calls for independent enquiry 
The Legal Aid Institute has called on the government to set up 
an enquiry into the death of Arnold Ap, and to end "the 
conspiracy of silence". LBH Director, T . Mulya Lubis, visited 
Jayapura in June when he heard from several sources that Ap 
was killed while he was in the hands of the security forces. The 
commission of enquiry should include "people from outside like 
lawyers and reporters , so the independent nature of the 
committee could be maintained". (Sydney Morning Herald , 30 
June 1984) 
Yap Thiam Hien, Vice-Chairman of the LBH, who 
accompanied Lubis on his trip, spoke of a climate of fear in 
Jayapura, "fear of being arrested, tortured and killed" , which 
had driven thousands into neighbouring Papua New Guinea 
(The Age, 6 July 1984) 
Mr Yap, who is also a member of the Indonesian Council of 
Churches, said it is a matter for regret that both Protestant and 
Catholic churches in the territory have kept silent about the 
situation there. (Kompas, 29 June 1984) 
ARNOLD AP 
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West Papua 
Many border villages deserted 
Thousands more refugees have fled to Papua New Guinea 
because of continued Indonesian army operations in villages in 
West Papua. International aid agencies have become concerned 
over the welfare of refugees who have arrived in remote parts of 
PNG along the border, many of whom may be receiving little or 
no assistance. There are reports that some refugees have been 
forced to go back into West Papua because food and shelter are 
not available for them at the small mission stations on the PNG 
side of the border. 
The number of West Papuan refugees in PNG has continued 
to increase since they first started arriving in February, and there 
are now over 10,000 camped all along the 700km border. It has 
also been suggested by the UN High Commission for Refugees 
that there may be more refugees in the forests who have not yet 
been accounted for. The greatest number have arrived in PNG 
since April, when the total began to rise dramatically; most of 
these are located just south of the central mountain range. In this 
district, around the mission station of Komopkin, there are over 
6,000 refugees , far more than any mission station could possibly 
support. The Indonesian press admits that over 7 ,000 people1 
left their villages in the area of West Papua immediately adj a cent 
to Komopkin. This means that the fate of about 1,000 people is 
still unknown. There have been other disturbing reports, from 
the UNHCR, from mission sources in PNG and from the OPM, 
of numbers of bodies, presumed to be refugees, being found 
near the border, although these have yet to be confirmed. 
The refugees present the PNG Government with a 
humanitarian problem of major proportions. But PNG is still 
under pressure from Indonesia to treat the problem as an 
internal matter between the two countries. Consequently, the 
UNHCR has not been permitted to visit areas of PNG which 
have received the majority of refugees (the UN agency is only 
allowed a presence in Vanimo, on the north coast) and there has 
been no assessment of the conditions in which most are having to 
live . The UNHCR has not been able to get aid to these remote 
parts of the border, and although the missions are now 
requesting assistance through their parent organisations, this 
may be too late to help many of the refugees. 
Refugees returning, claim military officials 
The first reports of refugees returning to West Papua came in the 
Indonesian press, which for the first time is reporting 
developments in West Papua almost every day. There is no 
independent confirmation of these reports. The papers have 
been covering a series of publicity campaigns by the Indonesian 
authorities which are trying to create the impression that there 
are no serious problems in West Papua. The campaign has been 
notable for the promin'ent role of the military commander of the 
region, General Sembiring, and the Deputy-Governor, General 
Sugiyono. Both men are East Timor veterans with experience of 
population control. Sugiyono has made several well reported 
visits to areas from which refugees have fled, and his statements 
have been quite open about the numbers of people involved in 
the mass exodus. Sinar Harapan (29 June), reporting Sugiyono's 
visit to the areas of Merauke province adjacent to Komopkin, 
said that in Waropka District, out of a population of 6,094, 4,350 
people had fled, and nine villages out of fourteen were deserted; 
456 people were said to have returned. In the sub-district of 
Mindiptanah, 3,290 people had fled , out of a total population of 
8,506, and 1,846 had apparently returned.2 Other observers who 
have visited the area recently confirm that large numbers of 
villages are completely deserted. 
Sugiyono has made much of the plans to relocate people in 
this area to new, controlled population centres with amenities 
such as markets, co-operatives and schools. This is ostensibly 
because many of the deserted villages were destroyed, for which 
the authorities blame the OPM although evidence suggests it was 
the work of the Indonesian Armed Forces. But the publicity is 
doubtless meant to give the impression that returning refugees 
will be well treated, so that attempts to accord West Papuans in 
PNG refugee status and give them the choice not to return will 
be weakened. Such widespread destruction of villages with 
immediate plans for replacing them with new population centres 
may also be evidence of attempts by the military to relocate 
people strategically, in order to deny support to the OPM and 
tighten control in the border area. This part of Merauke 
province will not be ready for transmigration sites for some 
years, so the forced absorption of local people into Javanese 
transmigrant communities is not yet possible there. It is worth 
noting that these developments are comparable with the 
strategic hamlet programme in East Timar during the late 1970s, 
which aimed to deprive Fretilin of its popular support base. 
1 See footnote (2) 
2 On 19 July, Sinar Harapan reported another trip to these areas, this 
time by the Governor, Izaac Hindom. This report said that 5,032 
people had deserted Mindiptanah villages, and 4,358 had fled from 
Waropka villages for a total.of nearly 9,400. This report said nothing 
about any villagers returning from PNG, only that "efforts to find and 
return these lost villagers" were under way. 
The location of refugee camps in PNG and the number of people in each 
one up to early July. 
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Indonesian journalist gets a 
taste of Papuan anger 
An Indonesian journalist who visited Blackwater camp near 
Vanimo recently got a taste of the deep hatred for Indonesia felt 
by Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea. The journalist, 
Susanto Pudjomartono of Tempo, describes in his detailed report 
of the visit how he encountered hostility as soon as the word got 
round that an Indonesian was in the camp. His escort, an official 
of the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs, tried to persuade the 
refugees to talk to Susanto. 
Soon we were surrounded by dozens of people, some of them shaking 
with fury. "We don't want any Indonesians here ," said one. 
" Indonesia is criminal. Throw him out." 
. . . The atmosphere became very tense as the crowd grew in size. 
"Cut his throat," said one, to which others responded, "Indonesians 
are cruel. They have murdered 150,000 Irianese in the past 20 years." 
Another clutched his hair with one hand and pointed the other at me, 
saying, "Anyone without curly hair isn't welcome here." 
Susanto then explains how the PNG escort tried to persuade 
the crowd, by now several hundred people, to step back, but the 
argument continued. As some pressed forward, others tried to 
calm them down. Eventually, things quietened down and two of 
the crowd of some 300 people, which included quite a Jot of 
women and children, stepped forward. One introduced himself 
as Tom who used to teach at Cendrawasih University, and said 
he had been a regular reader of Tempo. 
He said I could only take a look at the camp , but first they wanted to 
display some banners and posters. They were all written in English 
and appealed to the UN to intervene and resolve the question of Irian 
J'aya. 
After making a brief tour of the camp, Susanto and his escort 
arrived back near the road where their car was parked. Suddenly 
the escort shouted: 
"Run, quick . Things are getting dangerous." From the direction of 
the barracks, a long line of people were marching, bearing the OPM 
flag. There were some men running in front, wearing· army fatigues 
like Indonesian uniforms, and they were shouting . 
We took to our heels and fled . I tried to take a few shots with my 
camera. By the time I reached the car, I was covered in sweat. The 
engine had been started up already, but some people in the corwd 
were running in front of the car. We heard the police shout to the 
crowd to step back, and one of the policemen fired a warning shot. 
Even before the car doors had d osed, the vehicle moved away very 
fast . I heard my escort take a deep breath and say, "That was a near 
thing." We travelled at high speed all the way back, covering 25 kms 
in just ten minutes. 
Tempo, 9 June 1984 
A photo taken by Susanto Pudjomartono in Blackwater Camp. (Tempo, 9 June 1984) 
MPs call for UNHCR control over refugees 
Sixty Members of Parliament have supported a call in the House 
of Commons for the UNHCR to be allowed a direct role in 
handling the problem of refugees from West Papua now in 
Papua New Guinea. Four of the six sponsors of the Motion are 
from the Conservative Party and the other two are Labour. 
Altogether 39 of the signatories are from the Labour Party, 15 
are from the Conservative Party and 6 from the Liberal Party. 
The Motion, which will continue to collect signatures up to the 
end of the present session in early August, reads as follows: 
That this House, gravely concerned that the Government of Papua 
New Guinea intends to return immediately 8,000 refugees who have 
fled to Papua New Guinea from the Indonesian Province of Irian 
Jaya and whose lives are in danger if they go back without the 
involvement of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 
calls on Her Majesty's Government as a member of the 
Commonwealth to press the Governments of Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia not to send back any refugees without involving the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees and to permit the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees to screen refugees so that 
their exact status may be ascertained. 
Sponsors: Jerry Hayes, Alfred Dubs, Peter Bottomley, Dave 
Nellist , Robin Squire and Cyril D. Townsend. 
Signatories: Austin Mitchell , Paddy Ashdown, Greg Knight , 
D.N. Campbell-Savours, Ernie Ross, William McKelvey, David 
Knox, James Tinn, Roland Boyes, Robin Corbett, Frank Cook , 
Ernie Roberts, Clare Short, Robert Parry, Dennis Canavan , 
Laurie Pavitt, Ivan Lawrence, Richard Caborn, Dr Norman A . 
G~odman, . Sir Bernard Braine, Russell Johnston, Sydney 
Bidwell, Simon Hughes , Tom Clarke, Sean Hughes, Eric 
D~ak.in , Dr John Marek, Allan Rogers, Tony Lloyd, Bill 
M1ch1e, Harry Cohen, Joan Maynard, Michael Meadowcroft , 
Gerald Bermingham, David Atkinson, Piers Merchant, David 
Alton, Harry Greenway, Alex Carlile, John Fraser, Dr Jeremy 
Bray, Robert Litherland, Reg Freeson, Bowen Wells , George 
Park, Tony Banks, Norman Buchan, Patrick Ground, Charles 
Irving, Bob McTaggart , Chris Smith, Andrew Hunter, Mark 
Fisher and Ron Brown. 
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West Papua 
* Seth Rumkorem speaks at the UN 
For the first time ever, a representative of the West Papua 
independence movement, OPM, has addressed a UN body, 
drawing attention to the human rights violations in his country, 
and condemning the fact that his people have been denied the 
right to self-determination. Speaking in August to the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Seth Rumkorem, 
leader of the OPM who is now living in exile in Europe, drew 
attention to the role the UN played in 1962 in allowing Indonesia 
to occupy and rule West Papua in defiance of all accepted 
principles of decolonisation and self-determination, and urged 
the UN to take up its responsibility now to help find a peaceful 
solution to West Papua's tragic situation. 
Seth Rumkorem's appearance before the Working Group 
was sponsored by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society which 
itself made a submission on the situation in West Papua for the 
second year running . 
The OPM leader noted the most important events in West 
Papua's recent history dating back to the time of the Indonesian 
Declaration of Independence on 17 August 1945. Within hours 
of the declaration, he said, Markus Kaisieppo, representing 
West Papuan ' leaders at the time, notified the Dutch 
administration in West New Guinea that the West Papuan 
people would not become a part of the new Indonesian republic. 
Seth spoke at length about the brutal consequences of the 1962 
New York Agreement which, with the concurrence of the US 
government, handed West Papua over to Indonesia, with no 
guarantees for the survival of the West Papuan people. 
He told the Working Group that the OPM was carrying out 
an investigation of the number of people who had been killed, 
massacred or who had disappeared since the titne of the 
Indonesian takeover in 1963. The sum total from these 
investigations came to nearly 110,000 so far, though he stressed 
that there was often a time lag between incidents resulting in loss 
of life and information about the number of people involved, 
which means that the actual figure is much higher. The figures 
*Seth Rumkorem was prevented from leaving Greece at the last moment, so his 
statement was read out by Adolf Tombo. 
Recently Papuans in the Indonesian army were required to take a loyalty 
oath to Indonesia by crawling through the legs of General Meliana 
Sembiring, commander of the Irian Jaya Military Command. The general 
is holding a bow and arrow, the weapon used by the OPM, in his hands. 
(Sinar Harapan, 25 May 1984) 
given were related to the military operations undertaken by the 
Indonesian Armed Forces since the mid 1960s. These operations 
are as follows: 
Operasi Tumpas (Operation 'Crush') which took place under the 
command of General Kartidjo and General Bintoro (1964-68). 
Operasi Sadar (Operation 'Awareness') under the command of 
General Sarwo Edhie (1969) . 
Operasi Wibawa (Operation 'Authority') also known as the 
'open-handed policy' under the command of General Acub 
Zainul (1970-74) . 
Operasi Kikis (Operation 'Chipping-Away') under the command 
of General Imam Munandar (1977). 
Operasi Galang (Operation 'Support'), also known as the 
'smiling policy' , under the command of General Santoso (1981). 
Operasi Sapu Bersih (Operation 'Clean-Sweep') under the 
command of General Santoso and, after his death, General 
Sembiring, the present military commander (1981-84) 
Speaking about the most recent disappearances, the OPM 
estimates that about 5,000 people fled from West Papua in 
February 1984, but only 316 are known to have reached their 
destination in Papua New Guinea; the rest are feared to have 
disappeared. 
Anti-Slavery Society's submission 
The Anti-Slavery Society' submission declared that "the United 
Nations has a duty - if it is not to stand accused of hypocrisy -
to attempt to put right that grave wrong committed against the 
West Papuan people in 1969". Stressing that the West Papuan 
people were fighting a war of liberation "to achieve their 
independence from a colonial power", the Society asked the 
Working Group to communicate to the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that 
the legitimate aspirations of the people of West Papua to self-
determination are being met with brutal repression. 
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Two niore violations of PNG border 
The problems facing Papua New Guinea over the flood of 
refugees from West Papua and the Indonesian military 
operations there have kept up tension between the two 
countries. Indonesia has persisted in making unreasonable and 
contradictory demands on PNG, and has violated PNG's 
territory on at least two occasions. The PNG Government 
appeared at first to take a strong stand against Indonesia's 
attitude to the border problem, but since talks between the two 
countries' Foreign Ministers in April, PNG has instead tried to 
comply with most of Indonesia's demands. This has meant 
risking domestic opposition from a strongly anti-Indonesian 
public in PNG, and resisting international pressure to allow the 
UNHCR to supervise the West Papuan refugees. The PNG 
Government has attempted to keep publicity about the border 
area to a minimum, but events there have often frustrated its 
efforts, and show clearly the intractable dilemma now facing 
PNG over its relations with Indonesia. · 
At his meeting in April with Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, PNG Foreign Minister Rabbie 
Namaliu got no explanation for the violation of PNG airspace by 
two Indonesian aircraft in March, but Mochtar pressed Namaliu 
to give an assurance that OPM guerrillas would not be allowed to 
operate from PNG territory. 
Dispute over Australian television documentary 
This was later to lead to a major ' clash between the PNG 
Government and the Australian Broadcasting Commission , after 
an ABC journalist interviewed OPM leader James Nyaro, 
allegedly on the PNG side of the border. ABC were not the first 
to interview Nyaro on the border; other Australian, PNG and 
Fijian journalists had already done so. But the ABC interview 
came directly after Namaliu's assurance to Indonesia, and PNG 
insisted that it should not be screened on ABC's "Four Corners" 
programme, as planned, to which the ABC management agreed. 
The interview was screened, however, after an uproar by 
Australian journalists forced ABC to reverse its decision. The 
PNG Government responded by banning ABC journalists from 
working in PNG. 
Indonesia has made no secret of its role in the row between 
the PNG Government and ABC, which has damaged relations 
between Australia and PNG. Indonesia openly applauded 
PNG's decision, and the Times of Indonesia said it was "in the 
spirit of friendly and co-operative relations". Kompas followed 
by suggesting that the ban was "meant for Indonesia's 
consumption" (Age, 30 May). But if PNG thought this would 
ease the pressure from Indonesia on the border, it was mistaken. 
In the middle of May, Indonesia conducted massive military 
"exercises", about which, contrary to an assurance already given 
by Mochtar, PNG was not given prior warning. PNG was 
angered by this particular display of insensitivity since an 
assurance that PNG would be informed about such exercises was 
the oril concession made by Indonesia during the April talks. 
PNG Foreign Minister Rabbie ama m, an 
(Sinar Harapan, 11 July 1984) 
" ... We're still at odds over recent border crossings". Namaliu (Financial 
Review 13.7.84) 
Children at the Blackwater Camp. (From Susanto Pudjomartono's 
report, Tempo, 9 June 1984) 
PNG gardens destroyed in second incursion 
A more recent incident is likely to cause a further 
deterioration in relations between PNG and Indonesia, although 
Moch tar still calmly insists that relations are fine . On June 21 , 53 
Indonesian troops entered the village of Sowampa, inside PNG 
at the northern end of the border. They burned down ten huts , 
then proceeded to destroy gardens and plantations around the 
village. PNG authorities have collected substantial evidence to 
show that this attack was without doubt the work of the 
Indonesian army, yet Indonesia has denied responsibility, as it 
has before, and has gone so far as to counter PNG's formal 
protest with an accusation that a group of PNG citizens had gone 
into West Papua and killed an Indonesian. Behind the series of 
allegations and counter-allegations is a very clear build-up of 
pressure by Indonesia on PNG. Indonesia continues to drive 
refugees over into PNG, but refuses to co-operate in attempts to 
solve the problem, while at the same time insisting that the 
refugees must come back without the involvement of the ~N 
High Commission for Refugees. 
Quite clearly , the PNG Government cannot hope to deal with 
this situation in a way which will satisfy Indonesia, let alone 
public opinion in PNG. Many observers there and in other 
countries regard the border violations as a serious warning by 
Indonesia, while the presence of refugees in PNG and the 
activities of the OPM on the border may at any time be used by 
Indonesia as a grievance to justify further military actions. 
"The Philippines will never 
be the same again .. ?' and the 
Southeast Asia Chronicle explains why. 
"The Philippines After Aquino, After Marcos?" (Southeast 
A sia Clmlllide Issue No . 91). a probing analysis of the forces 
contending for control of the Philippines' future examines 
elite and leftist opposition, explores the econo-
-.~~ mic crisis, and relates details of the mystery 
.}~- surrounding Benigno Aquino's murder. 
h ~I (';'\ ,~ ~ · •) Also available: ~~~\\ "U.S. Military Uases in the 'i-S~" Philippines" (Issue No. 89) 
"The Philippines in the 80s -
From Normalization to Polarization" 
(Issue No. 83) 
"400-Year War-Moro Struggle in 
the Philippines" (Issue No. 82) 
Single copies S2. 50; 10 or more Sl. 50 
each plus posta.ge . 
Order from: Southt·ast .A. :; ia Resource C enter, Dept. T 
P. 0. Uox 40001), Uerkeley, CA 94709 ·Write for free ca ta lo• . 
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East Timar 
Self-determination for East Timor 
dropped from ALP programme 
The Australian Labour Party conference held in July this year 
failed to adopt a resolution reinforcing its policy of support for 
self-determination for East Timor. The policy adopted in 1982 
called for a halt to Australian military aid to Indonesia until it 
withdraws its occupation troops from East Timor and pledged 
Australia to support an act of self-determination. The 1984 
resolution which was lost by 43 votes to 55 would have also called 
on the Australian Government to reverse the previous 
government's decision to recognise Indonesia's illegal 
occupation of East Timor. 
However, feeling on the issue of East Tim or ran so high at the 
conference that the counter-resolution tabled by the faction of 
Prime Minister Bill Hayden, who has striven so hard for a policy 
of accommodation towards Indonesia, had to be drastically 
amended to ensure its passage . The amended resolution 
declared: 
The ALP indicates grave concern at reports of renewed fighting in 
East Timor and about the threats to human life and safety there, and 
calls on the Indonesian Government to give free access to 
humanitarian relief teams, to international organisations such as the 
Red Cross, Amnesty and the Commission of Jurists, to allow an 
independent international mission to enter the territory to make an 
independent and impartial report on conditions. 
On the crucial issue of the right of the East Timor people to 
decide their own future, however, the resolution went no further 
than to criticise Indonesia for incorporating East Timor without 
an internationally-supervised act of self-determination. It called 
on the Australian Government to support "international 
initiatives, including the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, 
that have the aim of achieving a settlement of the East Timor 
problem".(Financial Review, 12 July 1984) 
The political framework in which the resolution is cast is 
revealed by its emphasis on the need to work for better relations 
with Indonesia, and by a claim made by Mr Hayden during the 
debate on the resolution when he asserted that "if we want to do 
the best we can by the people of East Timor, then we must have 
an association with Indonesia which is credible (and) 
influential". (The Age, 12 July 1984) 
Within hours of the adoption of the ALP resolution, Bill 
Hayden was on his way to Jakarta to attend a "dialogue" with 
Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries, profoundly relieved 
that he was taking with him a policy that Indonesian senior 
officials had already said they could "live with". General Benny 
Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
was less generous however. He bluntly told the Australian 
Foreign Minister that attempts by anyone to send a mission to 
investigate human rights in East Timor would be regarded as an 
act of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. · (Sinar 
Harapan , 14 July 1984) 
Threats, counter-threats and on-off-on ambassadorial visit 
During the weeks preceding the ALP conference, East Timor 
and Australia's shaky relations with Indonesia were hardly ever 
off the front pages of the Australian press. Strenuous efforts by 
the Foreign Minister , sometimes supported and sometimes 
confounded by Jakarta, were made to ensure that the ALP 
conference would abandon its support for the principle of self-
determination for East Timar. 
Canberra had hoped that a visit to East Timor by its 
ambassador in Jakarta, planned for late May, would help ensure 
defeat for the self-determination resolution . But just a few days 
before the visit was to have taken place, it was announced in 
Jakarta that permission for the trip had been withdrawn. A 
variety of reasons were given for this change; some Indonesian 
newspapers reported that this was a reprisal against Australia for 
having given permission to Jose Ramos Horta, Fretilin's 
representative to the UN, to make a six-week speaking tour of 
Australia in preparation for the ALP conference. Others claim 
that the visit could not proceed because of "transportation 
difficulties" or because Indonesia could not vouch for the safety 
of the ambassador in East Tim or. 
In fact, the decision to cancel the visit was taken at a time 
when Indonesian military operations in East Timor were again 
being stepped up (see separate item) . That this was the real 
reason is proven by the fact that it was not only the ambassador's 
visit that was cancelled. A visit by an International Red Cross 
team that was to have taken place at the same time was also 
stopped. But the decision to cancel the ambassador's visit also 
served the purpose of showing the Australian Government that 
Jakarta could be "tough", and would use all forms of pressure to 
assert its will on the government of Bob Hawke and the 
Australian Labour Party. 
Editorial East Timor injustice 
While v1s1tmg Indonesia this week, 
Secretary of State George Shultz has a 
chance to demonstrate US 
evenhandedness in opposing unjust 
colonial wars. Everyone knows where 
Washington stands on Afghanistan and 
Cambodia, nations occupied by 
Communist neighbors. But Indonesia's 
occupation of East Timar has been passed 
over by three US administrations with 
shamefully vague murmurs of the kind 
Americans scorn in United Nations 
declarations. 
Indonesia has triply offended. It 
invaded East Timar, a former Portuguese 
colony, in 1975. A year later it annexed the 
territory. And under its administration 
since then, more than 100,000 Timorese, a 
sixth of the mostly Catholic population, are 
believed to have died from famine, disease 
8 
and fighting . The extent of the calamity 
can only be estimated because Jakarta has 
impeded relief measures and closed the 
island to foreign observers. 
Americans have only gradually become 
aware of Indonesia's assault on this poor 
and primitive territory. The pretext is 
combating Communism. The invasion 
began a day after President Gerald Ford 
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
visited Jakarta. Though they did not 
condone the attack, they failed to condemn 
it. 
Mr. Shultz has been reminded of this 
persisting neglect by the bipartisan plea of 
22 senators and 123 representativ~s. They 
urge him to press Indonesia to give relief 
organizations and other monitors 
unrestricted access to East Tim or. Last 
Saturday their appeal was reinforced by an 
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unusual admonition from Pope John Paul 
II . 
In accepting the credentials of an 
Indonesian ambassador, a general, the 
Pope broke with custom by speaking out 
on behalf of the East Timorese. He 
"earnestly recommended" respect for their 
human rights and said it was his "ardent 
wish" that relief organizations gain access 
to the many in need. 
East Timor has as much right to self-
determination as Cambodia and 
Afghanistan. At the minimum, its people 
should be rescued from starvation and 
brutal persecution. Saying that may not 
sway Indonesia's military rulers. But they 
need to hear it , and high-placed Americans 
need to say it. 
New York Times, 11 July 1984 
While the Australian media was still expressing anger over the 
cancellation and predicting that Hayden was now "sunk on 
Timar'', Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja 
warned that Indonesia might take steps to downgrade its 
relations with Australia. According to the Sydney Morning 
Herald Foreign Editor, Peter Hastings (29 June 1984), Mochtar 
implied that an anti-Indonesian resolution on East Timar could 
lead to a "major break" in relations between the two countries, 
though he denied that Indonesia might withdraw its ambassador 
from Canberra. Fretilin's UN representative, Jose Ramos Horta 
described this as "an arrogant bluff, a smart political strategy for 
the ALP conference" (The Age, 30 June) and referred to the 
Australian ambassador's projected visit as a "farce, a big joke 
and irrelevant because the idea of the whole trip is to present a 
rosy picture". 
Bill Hayden however persisted in seeing the cancellation as a 
severe blow to his chances of pushing through with his policy of 
accommodation, and pleaded desperately with Mochtar to allow 
the visit to go ahead (SMH, 27 June). In the end, Jakarta 
announced that the visit was "on" again, and it took place just a 
few days before the ALP conference opened. By this time, the 
impact was minimal, and in any case, the ambassador was to 
complain at the conclusion of his trip that it had been "too 
narrow". It turned out to be a feeble gesture indeed, for the 
ambassador was not permitted to do more than visit the prison 
island of Atauro, go briefly by helicopter to Manatuto, 66 kms 
east of Dili, hold a meeting with East Timor's puppet governor, 
Mario Carrascalao, and pay a visit to a bridge built with funds 
from Australia. This was virtually nothing by comparison with 
what the Australian parliamentary mission had been allowed to 
see last July, just before the 1983 offensive was launched. 
Postscript: "Timor Gap" negotiations can now proceed 
Shortly after Bill Hayden's visit to Jakarta, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja announced that negotiations between Indonesia 
and Australia over exploitation of petroleum resources in the 
"Timar Gap" can now be resumed. (See "The 'Timar Gap': Oil 
and Trouble", in TAPOL Bulletin No 63, May 1984.) Since the 
ALP has now agreed not to question any more East Timor's 
"integration" into Indonesia, the Indonesian Government is 
willing, he said, to continue negotiations with Australia. (Sinar 
Harapan, 18 July, 1984) On several occasions earlier this year, 
Mochtar declared that Indonesia was in "no hurry" to resume 
negotiations on the "Timar Gap" , and insisted that Australia's 
position on the question was "untenable". 
Indonesian military offensive resumed 
The Indonesian offensive launched last August which ground 
to a halt in the face of stiff opposition from Fretilin (see T APOL 
Pope speaks out on East Timor 
The Pope used the opportunity of his first 
meeting with a new Indonesian 
ambassador to declare publicly that the 
Roman Catholic Church is concerned 
about the situation in East Timar. He also 
said that the church is anxious that 
individual rights be respected in Irian Jaya 
(West Papua): 
After accepting the credentials of 
ambassador Hardiman Sastrapoespita, the 
Pope said: 
Regarding the situation in East Timor, you 
know with what attention the Holy See views 
this very delicate problem. The Holy See 
continues to follow the situation with 
preoccupation and with the hope that 
particular consideration will be given in 
every circumstance to the ethnic, religious 
and cultural identity of the people. 
Bulletin No. 62, March 1984) and because of the rainy season 
from November to March, was resumed some time in May. The 
first report of these renewed operations came in an AFP report 
from Jakarta (The Australian, 28 May 1984) stating that 15,000 
Indonesian troops were engaged in operations involving 
helicopters, aircraft and armoured cars. The report spoke of 
"fierce fighting, numerous arrests, (and) search operations .. . " 
Two days later, Pat Walsh, speaking for the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) said that the real reason for 
the cancellation of the Australian Ambassadors's visit to East 
Timar was the resumption of military operations. Information in 
the past week, he said, indicated that Indonesian troops were 
"poised for a final assault". (The Age, 30 May.) As on previous 
occasions, ACFOA's information was based on its sources 
within the church in East Timar and Indonesia. 
Reporting from Lisbon, Jill Jolliffe was able, a month later, 
to produce eye-witness testimony from East Timorese refugees 
who left the country early in June. They described the recent 
flight of many East Timorese civilians to mountain areas, 
reminiscent of the departure of Timorese to the mountains in 
1975, at the time of the first Indonesian invasion of East Timar. 
These flights were taking place, said the refugees, possibly 
because people wanted to join Fretilin forces, though many were 
certainly impelled by fear of the current Indonesian operations, 
or by a desire to avoid conscription, because all males between 
the ages of 15 and 50 were again being forced to march ahead of 
Indonesian troops, to provide them with a human shield. (The 
Age, 29 June) 
The newly-arrived refugees spoke of an engagement between 
Fretilin and Indonesian troops at Be-Moz on the outskirts of Dili 
on 3 June, of fighting in the region of Same on the central south 
coast two weeks earlier, and of an attack on 8 May in the 
Viqueque region farther to the east in which more than a 
hundred houses had been burnt down. The refugees 
said there was constant military movement in Dili and that early this 
year, an encampment of three battalions had been established at 
Coconut Beach north-west of Dili ... Surveillance aircraft, in groups 
of thr~e, w_ere over-~ying Dili daily and helicopters brought wounded 
to D1h m1htary ~?spltal dally: They said there was one hospital flight 
a week from D1h to Indonesia for the seriously wounded (and that) 
funerals of Indonesian soldiers in the "war heroes" section of the Dili 
cemetery were a regular occurrence. 
The refugees also confirmed that the Catholic Church in East 
Timar was facing great difficulty. The Bishop of Dili, Mgr Carlos 
Philipe X. Belo, who sent a letter earlier this year to his 
predecessor bitterly complaining about grave human rights 
abuses in East Timar since the start of the 1983 offensive (see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 63, May 1984), was taken to Bali for an 
inquiry by the Indonesian authorities, the refugees said. They 
spoke about his efforts to restrain Indonesian activities against 
Timorese civilians. 
Indonesian troops get ready for a killing. From East Timor, early 1984. 
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Death Squads 
The killing that becante an entbarrassDlent 
When police-officer Jarot Taftoyani went out one night in July 
last year to catch an alleged drugs-pusher, he clearly regarded his 
operation as b€ing part of the anti-crime wave launched several 
months earlier by the Jogjakarta army garrison. Unlike the army 
killers however, as things turned out, he would pay the ultimate 
penalty for his deed, in the interests of a cover-up by the 
authorities. 
Armed with a scimitar (celurit), the weapon used by many of 
the death-squads who by that time had killed hundreds of alleged 
criminals on the streets of Jogjakarta, police-officer Jarot 
followed up a tip-off from a prostitute. He caught the suspect as 
he was coming out of a brothel. He hacked him down, then 
called for an ambulance to take the victim to hospital, but the 
man was dead within hours. The victim turns out to have been a 
student at Gaja Mada University who was in fact carrying out an 
investigation into night-life in Jogjakarta. 
Although Jarot had been acting under orders, he was not 
commended for his successful operation. On the contrary, he 
was placed under arrest, the only known instance in which an 
officer participating in the officially-sponsored campaign of 
murdering alleged criminals found himself behind bars. Within 
two months, he had been dismissed from the force and was told 
that he would be tried for murder before a military court. 
By the end of 1983, Jarot was feeling increasingly resentful of 
his situation, so in January this year, he managed to draw public 
attention to his case by sending a request to the Legal Aid 
Institute in Jogjakarta for legal assistance to back up his demand 
for an early trial. (Sinar Harapan, 10 January 1984). The LBH 
announced that it had accepted his case. Representations had 
been made to the authorities to treat the case in accordance with 
the Criminal Procedure Code which had already been violated in 
a number of ways, not least because the time limit on holding a 
suspect without trial had long since expired. 
Nothing happened however, and in March Jarot took another 
East Timor 
Team of top-ranking generals 
visit East Timor 
On 2 July, General Benny Murdani made yet another visit to 
East Timor, this time in the company of nearly a dozen high-
ranking officers from all the armed forces. The team included 
Lieutenant-General Gunawan Wibisono, Chief-of-Staff for 
Social and Political Affairs, Commander of the Fleet, Vice-
Admiral R. Ka.senda, the Assistant for Intelligence of the 
General Chief-of-Staff, the Assistant for Operations, the 
Assistant for Territorial Affairs and the Assistant for Security 
and Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the three 
Assistants for Operations of the Army, Navy and Air Force 
Chiefs-of-Staff, and other senior officers from the Armed Forces 
headquarters; no fewer than ten generals in the Indonesian 
Armed Forces. Such a senior team of officers can only be 
explained by the importance which General Murdani currently 
attaches to the military operations now under way in his 
desperate attempt to put an end to continued resistance to 
Indonesian rule in East Tim or. 
123 Members of Congress 
write to George Schultz 
A group of no fewer than 123 members of the US Congress, 
including members of the House of Representatives 
from both parties, sent an appeal to US 
Secretary of State George Schultz to make East Timor an 
move to publicise his plight by escaping from prison and going 
into hiding. (Kompas, 23 March 1984.) A week later, he turned 
up at the office of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta. "I was 
carrying out orders," he told the LBH's Director~ T. ~ulya 
Lubis, "but I fully accept responsibility for what I did. If 1t was 
wrong, I am prepared to be punished." But he complained 
bitterly of being held in detention without trial, of having been 
dismissed from the force even before a verdict had been passed, 
and of the fact that his family was now left without any income or 
support. 
Acting on Jarot's instructions, the LBH immediately made 
contact with Police Force headquarters in Jakarta. Upon 
receiving assurances from a senior officer that Jarot would be 
given full legal protection and would be brought to trial very 
soon, the LBH Director handed Jarot back to the police. Jarot 
himself seems to have been satisfied with these arrangements, 
for he declared soon afterwards in an interview (Sinar Harapan 
Minggu, 8 April 1984) that he had escaped from prison not in 
order to evade responsibility but to back his demand for proper 
treatment. He was a policeman with long experience, he said, 
and if he had wanted to disappear altogether, he could very well 
have done so. 
A couple of weeks later, it appeared that Jarot had made his 
point with good effect for his trial did indeed commence. 
However, all was not well for, despite the fact that he had 
already been dismissed from the force, he was tried by a military 
court. Moreover, a few days before the trial commenced, the 
Jogjakarta LBH received a note from him saying that he no 
longer wanted them to defend him and was prepared to leave his 
case in the hands of a military lawyer. Even though the note was 
hand-written, the LBH found it difficult to understand the 
reason for his change of heart, since he had gone to such lengths 
to make contact with the Institute and obtain their help. Unusual 
too was the fact that the trial was completed in a matter of days, 
important part of his agenda during a visit to Jakarta in the first 
half of July. 
Mr Schultz who was visiting Jakarta to attend a dialogue with 
foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries was told in the letter 
that it was of crucial importance "that the plight of the people of 
East Timor be accorded serious attention" in his meetings with 
the Indonesian leadership. The letter pointed out that the people 
of East Timor "are living under a military regime imposed by 
force, in violation of international law''. It dwelt at great length 
on the letter from the Bishop of Dili released earlier this year 
(see TAPOL Bulletin No. 63, May 1984) which drew attention to 
human rights violations and to persecution of the Catholic 
church. It complained that further details of atrocities and 
conditions generally in East Timor are virtually impossible to 
obtain because the Indonesian regime continues to seal off the 
country from independent journalists and international church 
and human rights groups. 
The members of Congress reminded Mr Schultz of Section 
914 of the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill, passed by the House 
of Representatives earlier this year, expressing the "sense of 
Congress" that President Reagan should take appropriate 
measures to .o:ncourage the Indonesians to allow increased access 
to East Timor for journalists, relief agencies and human rights 
organisations. 
Besides calling on the Secretary of State to raise the issue of 
the chu.rch's right to exist in East Timor free of persecution and 
harassment, the letter urged him to use his visit "to begin a 
dialogue with the Indonesians on constructive initiatives that 
could lead to an equitable settlement of the conflict in East 
Timor". (The Age, 11 July 1984) 
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whereas court proceedings for serious cases often drag out for 
weeks, if not months. . 
Within ten days, Jarot had been found guilty of murder and 
sentenced to 41/2 years imprisonment. Jarot accepted the verdict 
and announced that he would not make an appeal. On the other 
hand, the prosecutor who had called for a sentence of 6 years 
announced that he was not satisfied and would appeal against the 
sentence. 
But nine days later, Jarot was found dead in his cell. The 
authorities claimed that he hanged himself, but press reports of 
the discovery are disinclined to accept this version. Jarot's 
father, himself a police officer of many years standing, strongly 
rejects the claim and has declared that the marks round the dead 
man's neck were the marks of strangulation, not of hanging. 
(Sinar Harapan, 17 May 1984). Nor did he, or anyone else for 
that matter, want to accept that the "suicide" note said to have 
been found pinned to Jarot's body was indeed written by him. 
newspapers ever since his first move in January to seek the help 
of the LBH in Jogjakarta. Nowhere is it stated explicitly in any of 
the reports that the murder he committed last July was part of 
the officially-sponsored death-squad campaign, yet everything 
Jarot himself is reported to have said clearly reveals that this is 
what he thought. The LBH Director made it known after Jarot 
had been found dead that the policeman had told him he had 
killed 40 "suspected criminals" before killing the student which 
led to his own arrest (Sunday Sun, Melbourne, 17 June 1984). 
The Jarot case has been widely reported in some Indonesiah 
An open trial in a civil court would have given him the 
opportunity to argue precisely that in his own defence. The LBH 
in Jakarta has now made a call for a public enquiry by a .team of 
people from the Armed Forces, the Police Force, the medical 
profession, the LBH, and a journalist. (Minggu Merdeka, 27 
May 1984.) Such an enquiry is unlikely to take place, but the 
tragic death of police-officer Jarot shows the lengths to which the 
regime is prepared to go to cover up its own involvement with 
the death-squad killings. 
Fugitive from the 
death-squads 
Fugitive from the death-squads 
On 16 November last year, Sugianto, a 
third-form secondary school pupil in the 
town of Kertosono, near Jombang, set out 
on a motorbike with his father, Ichsan to 
visit the army commander (Koramil) of 
Perak, in the province of East Java. lchsan 
was carrying a large sum of money, and 
was making his fourth visit to the newly-ap-
pointed Koramil officer, to pay yet another 
instalment of "protection money". Several 
months earlier, lchsan, the son of a rich 
local farmer, had been told that he was on 
the hit list of the death-squads. 
A man known many years ago in the 
locality as a petty criminal, lchsan had long 
since abandoned crime, taken off his black-
magic protective amulet, and settled down 
to a life of farming. But in 1983, when the 
death-squads launched their so-called 
"anti-crime" campaign, Ichsan found him-
self the victim of persistent harassment by 
local police officers. The first time the 
police came demanding cash was in mid 
1983. In return for an assurance that he 
would not be killed, Ichsan handed over 
-
Rp 5 million, and within weeks, two more 
payments of Rp 2.5 million and Rp 2 mill-
ion had been made. "I lost count of how 
many times they came to the house," says 
Sugianto, "but altogether he paid them a 
total of Rp 30 million." To keep up these 
payments, lchsan sold off his land, as well 
as other possessions like gold and a couple 
of motorbikes. 
Then the KoramH officer got into the 
racket, and demanded regular payments of 
Rp 100,000. But as Ichsan and his son were 
on their way to the Koramil office that fate-
ful 16 November, they were set upon by 
two police officers and robbed of all the 
cash Ichsan had with him. That finished, 
father and son proceeded on their way to 
the Koramil office but within minutes ofar-
riving, the policemen who had just ac-
costed them turned up. They were called 
into the Koramil office by the army officer; 
the three men grabbed Ichsan, threw him 
to the ground and shot him in the chest. As 
he lay dying, Ichsan shouted to his son to 
flee for his life. Although the police had by 
then tied Sugianto's hands behind his back, 
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he managed to pull them free, and fled 
from the scene of his father's murder, with 
shots cracking behind him. 
Sugianto managed to hide in a nearby 
sugar plantation, then later returned home 
briefly to tell his family of the tragedy that 
had befallen his father. He then left home 
and went into hiding. For several months 
he lived as a fugitive in East Java, then in 
Samarinda, East Kalimantan, but eventu-
ally decided to seek protection from a 
Legal Aid Institute. He did this in Jog-
jakarta, at the Legal Aid Institute of the Is-
lamic University , where he told the story of 
his father's death. The Institute decided to 
launch an immediate investigation. The 
Koramil officer, they discovered, was still 
at his post but evaded all attempts to make 
inquiries about the incident. As for the 
policemen who had robbed lchsan then 
later participated in his murder, all they 
would say was "We're just low-ranking 
officers. Ask our superiors." 
According to Tempo (26 May, 1984) 
which gives a full account of the incident, 
the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute is deter-
mined to pursue its enquiries. Approaches 
to the chief of police of East Java have pro-
duced nothing. According to Kompas (25 
May) the Institute has taken the case to the 
Chief of Police in Jakarta. 
Meanwhile, Sugianto continues to live 
the life of a fugitive from the death-squads. 
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Residents near Haliill airport 
driven froill their land 
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In the latter part of 1983, the commander of Halim Perdanakusumah airport, which is 
situated on the outskirts of Jakarta, issued instructions to a special military unit to 
demolish the houses of many families living in the region of Cipinang Baru Trikora III 
which lies in the vicinity of the airport. Halim is the international civilian air terminal for 
the capital and is also used for military purposes. There are altogether 2,037 families 
living in the region, a total of more than 10,000 people. They have been trying to defend 
their land rights since the time of the Japanese occupation. 
It was in April 1945, just four months 
before the collapse of the Japanese Army, 
that the inhabitants were ordered to vacate 
their homes and land because the area was 
needed for aerial war operations. The 
people had no option but to comply and 
were given removal expenses to cover the 
cost of setting up home elsewhere. No 
compensation for the land was paid 
however because it was made clear at the 
time that they were only being asked to 
move for the duration of the war. After the 
end of the Japanese occupation, the 
inhabitants moved back and have been 
living there ever since. 
Starting in 1968 however, the people 
were threatened with expulsion by the 
Armed Forces (ABRI) who insisted that 
the land was their property because it had 
been acquired by the state at the time of 
the Japanese occupation. The inhabitants, 
on the other hand, insist that this is not so 
and that they will not relinquish the land 
until they have been paid due recompense . 
Their case has been supported by a number 
of declarations and testimonies. One 
comes from a man named lsro 
Djajakusumah who was an official of the 
local administration at the time of the 
Japanese occupation and who was himself 
involved in paying removal costs to the 
inhabitants. In 1965, the Department for 
Agrarian Affairs confirmed that the land 
had been taken over by force by the 
Japanese authorities and that this had 
meant no change whatever in the land 
rights of the owners of the land. Then in 
1973, the Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin 
wrote a letter to the Department of 
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Defence and Security complaining that the 
Air Force had appropriated 511 plots of 
land in the region for which no 
compensation had been paid. 
For a period of several years from the 
late 1970s, the inhabitants of Cipinang 
Baru Trikora III were left in peace, but in 
1983 the Air Force renewed its efforts to 
gain control of the land, still insisting that 
the people living there had no right to 
compensatiOn. It was then that orders were 
first issued for troops to move in and 
destroy some of the houses. Tractors and 
bulldozers were used by armed troops; 
people were man-handled and taken into 
custody, and dogs were set against people 
who had come out to protest. In an attempt 
to defend their homes, women and 
children threw stones and clumps of earth 
at the troops. The families whose homes 
had been demolished still refused to move 
and set up hovels and Qlake-shift tents for 
shelter. 
Following the illegal demolition, a 
group of people went to Parliament to 
draw attention to their plight, and to press 
for the payment of compensation. Said one 
young schoolgirl among the 
demonstrators: "Our home hasn't yet been 
demolished but it could happen any day. 
We live in constant fear of this." Another 
woman, a mother with a three-year old 
child, said: "We bought our land there in 
1978 and paid Rp 3,000 per square metre 
for it. This was money we obtai1,1ed from 
selling our home and land in Wonogiri." 
But she also explained that since living in 
her new home, she had never been able to 
obtain an identity card. Indeed, for many 
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years, none of the inhabitants have been 
issued with identity cards. 
With increasing militancy on the part of 
the inhabitants over their unjust treatment, 
General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-
Chief of ABRI, declared in September last 
year that all the land in the vicinity of the 
Halim airport is the property of ABRI. He 
also said: "It is in the interest of security of 
both military and civilian aviation for the 
entire area to be cleared. If anyone 
attempts to prevent this happening, 
KOPKAMTIB (the army's special security 
command) will take the strongest 
measures." 
Since then, the struggle to resist the 
takeover of the land has not subsided 
however. The inhabitants decided to put 
their case in the hands of the Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH) in Jakarta. In February 
this year, the day before further demolition 
of property was to take place, the LBH 
wrote to the local lurah (village 
administrative head) demanding that all 
further demolition should not be allowed 
to proceed until a court verdict on the 
dispute has been taken. The LBH at the 
same time submitted a formal complaint to 
the district court against the military 
commander of Halim airport, insisting that 
no further clearances should take place 
until the court has adopted a decision on 
the land rights of the people in question. 
(Based on an article in Indonesia Feiten en 
Meningen, the publication of the Dutch 
Indonesia Committee, Volume 10, No 2, 
June/July 1984.) 
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Compulsion being used in Indonesia's 
family planning programme 
Various forms of compulsion are being 
used by Indonesia's Family Planning 
Programme administrators to force women 
to practise birth control. Although the 
programme has been in progress for more 
than a decade, it has failed to have any 
impact on the rate of population increase 
which still stands at 2.3%. The Five-Year 
Plan which commenced in April this year 
has set a target of reducing this rate of 
increase to 2% by 1989. (Sinar Harapan, 
16 July 1984) In addition to imposing 
illegal sanctions on women to force them to 
practise birth control, Indonesia's family 
planners have launched an intensive 
campaign to persuade them to use the coil 
(IUD) rather than the pill because women 
have shown resistance to the programme 
by simply not taking the pill . 
In a cover story entitled "The Successes 
and Excesses of Family Planning'~, Tempo 
(14 July 1984) reported that, in their deter-
mination to achieve targets set by the pro-
vincial and national planners, local officials 
have resorted to compulsion to keep up the 
number of "acceptors". The journal gives 
details of several methods. For example, 
primary school teachers in Jepara district, 
East Java, were told three months ago that 
their salaries will no longer be paid if they 
cannot produce a certificate of participa-
tion in the programme; failure to partici-
pate will also damage their chances of 
promotion to higher salary grades. In Pati 
District, villagers have complained that 
they are being penalised for non-participa-
tion in the government-sponsored prog-
ramme even though they practise tradi-
tional methods of contraception. In the 
case of one couple where the husband is a 
civil servant, the wife has now been forced 
to accept a coil (IUD) although they have 
been successfully practising traditional 
methods for more than four years; if not, 
the husband would have been denied his 
salary. 
In some villages in the Pati District, vil-
lage councils have adopted a decision that 
women who become pregnant before their 
previous child reaches the age of four will 
have to pay a fine of Rp 25,000 (the equiva-
lent of about $25) , a heavy sanction for any 
villager. Women who already have three 
children will be fined this amount for get-
ting pregnant at all. The system is also 
being used to penalise unmarried women 
who become pregnant, for they will be re-
quired to pay a fine of no less than Rp 
100 000 with the threat of three months in 
pris~n of they fail to pay up. Women in 
several villages are quoted as saying they 
are repeatedly being harassed with the 
threat of fines if they do not participate in 
the official birth control programme. 
Java , Tempo refers to a woman who is de-
termined to practise traditional methods of 
birth control but has been forced in addi-
tion to take the pill. "If I don't," she said, 
"I will be denied various facilities such as 
getting treatment at the local clinic or ob-
taining credit for food-growing ." 
Asked about these abuses, Haryono 
Suyono, chief of the National Coordina-
tion Body for Family Planning said: "We 
have to deal with 20,000 people a day so 
some people are bound to get trodden on 
in the process." 
"Coil-safari" in West Java 
Efforts to persuade women to accept the 
coil were greatly speeded up late last year 
when Haryono Suyono made a "coil-
safari" (safari-spiraal) through West Java 
late last year in the company of the 
Governor of the province. Meetings were 
held in many villages which all women of 
child-bearing age were expected to attend, 
and where they were under strong pressure 
to have the coil inserted on the spot. 
Inevitably, the "success rate" of such 
meetings was extremely high. The 
chairman of the Family Planning Board in 
the Sukabumi District, West Java has 
recently been quoted as saying that all 
participants of the birth control 
programme in his district will be using the 
coil by the end of 1984. 
Meanwhile , the following letter was 
published in the letters' column of Sinar 
Harapan on 23 March 1984: 
According to instructions issued by the 
Bupati (District Chief) of Pandeglang (East 
Java) , government employees were told to 
go to the District office to pick up their 
March salary and to take with them their 
family planning certificates. 
I was greatly disappointed because , after 
making the long journey to fetch my salary, I 
was not paid because my family planning cer-
tificate was turned down. I was informed that 
certificates for acceptors using the pill are no 
longer valid according to an instruction from 
the Bupati , and the cashier was not allowed 
to give any concessions. 
I have been enrolled with the family planning 
programme for one year and my youngest 
child is 2 years old . As far as I know, the pill 
is an acceptable method of birth control 
under the government's family planning 
programme. So why is the pill not acceptable 
for the Bupati of Pandeglang? I would like 
an explanation for such methods being used 
by administration officials. Government 
employees are being victimised for the sake 
of the family planning programme. 
(Name and address known to the editors) 
In another part of the country, in the 
village of Kampung Kertoraharja in West Suharto makes a state occasion of it (Both photos from Tempo, 14 July 1984) 
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Guest column 
Black cargo of the military regime 
Indonesia is already well-known as an 
exporter of 'tlatural resources and 
agricultural products, but in the past few 
years, new exports have been added to the 
country's balance of trade . One of these 
new exports is labour. 
According to Minister of Labour, 
Admiral Sudomo, the foreign currency 
earned from the export of lapour 
amounted to US$23 . 7 million in the first 
six months of 1983. 1 Sudomo has also said 
that the export of labour has good long 
term prospects,2 and that the target for the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan which commenced 
in April this year is for a total export of 
300,000 people which will add altogether 
$1.8 billion to the country's foreign 
exchange earnings. 3 This figure could well 
be greatly exceeded because Abdul Malik 
M. Aliun, Vice-Chairman of the 
Indonesian Manpower Suppliers 
Association has said that 100,000 workers 
are to be exported this year, of whom 
roughly one half will probably be women. 4 
The Indonesian military government 
has set up a special agency within the 
Department of Labour known as AKAN 
(Antar-Kerja Antar Negara, the Inter-State 
Labour Agency), to exploit this new source 
of foreign exchange as effectively as 
possible. The two most senior officials of 
the Labour Department are both to.p-
ranking military men, Admiral Sudo mo 
who, till March 1983, was Commander of 
the Army's top security command, 
KOPKAMTIB, and General Sutopo 
Yuwono, formerly chief of the state's 
intelligence coordination agency, BAKIN, 
who is now Secretary-General of the 
Department. Admiral Sudomo says that 
the purpose of AKAN is to supervise the 
export of labour,5 and there are in addition 
a number of private companies which 
handle the registration and technical 
arrangements of people applying to work 
abroad. These private companies are, 
according to reliable sources, owned by 
people occupying top positions in the 
government apparatus or who have close 
links with senior officials. 
Anyone wishing to register for 
employment overseas is required to pay a 
registration fee which varies from Rp. 
300,000 to Rp. 400,000 (approximately 
$300 to $400) .6 A couple of years ago, the 
World Bank raised Indonesia's 
classification from a "low income" to a 
"middle income" country, but it would be a 
mistake to think that there has been any 
fundamental improvement in the standard 
of living of the vast majority of 
Indonesians. For the average Indonesian 
industrial worker who is not likely to earn 
more than Rp 20,000 a month in major 
cities like Jakarta, Surabaya or Medan, let 
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alone the millions of unemployed, it is 
hardly possible to scrape together a sum of 
money like that. Most workers would need 
to borrow extensively or sell off everything 
they have, and only hope to make enough 
to pay this back later on . In some cases, 
money paid for registration is 
misappropriated by the handling company 
and there is no compensation for people 
who suffer such a loss. 
Many people are attracted by the 
chance of finding jobs abroad not only 
because of the higher salary but also 
because of the lack of job opportunities at 
home.7 Those who go abroad are generally 
between the ages of 19 and 30, though 
women now being sent in growing numbers 
to Saudi Arabia are between 23 and 40 
years old . They have all completed primary 
or lower secondary education, and there 
are some too who have graduated from 
upper secondary school. Almost all are 
employed as unskilled labour in the 
construction industry, road-building, as 
plantation workers, gardeners, masseuses 
and house-servants. Before leaving, they 
are required to attend a short orientation 
course, -and for those being sent to 
countries in the Middle East , they are 
expected to learn at least 500 Arabic words 
before departing. Most of the people being 
sent to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates are women who will be employed 
as servants, and they, like all the other 
exported workers, must undergo political 
indoctrination in the Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution. The government 
obviously believes that women who go 
abroad as servants should be able to 
uphold the good name and reputation of 
Indonesia as a state based on the Pancasila. 
In Sabah, East Malaysia, there are now 
120,000 Indonesian contract labourers, 
80% of whom work in the plantation 
sector, and throughout Malaysia there are 
probably as many as half a million 
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Indonesian workers already. Recently 
Ashar Ahmat, the lawyer who heads the 
legal aid team of the trade union 
organisation, FBSI, expressed serious 
concern over the lack of legal protection 
for contract workers in Malaysia.s He gave 
the example of Indonesians employed by 
the Serawak Palm Oil Company whose 
contract provides for a daily wage of M$8, 
excluding overtime. The contract stipulates 
that the workers are to be provided with 
accommodation free of charge but upon 
arrival they discover that they have to pay 
M$10 a month for electricity plus M$70 a 
month for food , and on top of that , they 
have to supply their own work tools9 
Maltreatment of women workers in Saudi 
Arabia 
About 10,000 of the roughly 50,000 In-
donesians now working in Saudi Arabia 
are women, almost all of whom are 
employed as house-servants. More Indone-
sian women are working there than in any 
other foreign country. In many cases, the 
women are married, and with grown-up 
children. Some have explained that they 
decided very reluctantly to take advantage 
of this opportunity because they were find-
ing it impossible to pay school-fees to keep 
their children at school. 10 
Companies which handle the export of 
labour advertise the attractions of working 
in Saudi Arabia by speaking of the high 
wages paid for very light work and also 
stress that taking a job in that country pro-
vides the person with a better chance of 
making the pilgrimage to Mecca. 11 The lat-
ter point is bound to attract a lot of people 
in a country where nearly 90% of the popu-
lation are either orth.odox or "statistical" 
Muslims. The idea of taking a job abroad is 
made even more appealing by the great 
publicity now being given to the venture, 
with frequent photographs appearing in 
the press showing the Minister of Labour 
giving the women a warm send-off at spe-
cially organised ceremonies. The Indone-
sian ambassador to Saudi Arabia said in a 
press conference at the Department of 
Labour late last year that plans are now 
under way to open massage parlours with 
Indonesian labour in Saudi Arabia.12 
The large-scale dispatch of women to 
Saudi Arabia has recently been at the 
centre of public protest in Indonesia. A 
spokesperson for the Indonesian National 
Women's Movement (Perwarnas) de-
scribed it as "covert trading in women" . 13 
Sudomo's reply was that Indonesia is a 
"democratic country" where people can 
say what they like but he was satisfied that 
these women are well protected by their 
contracts, and they are also under the 
watchful eye of the Indonesian ambassy in 
Jeddah.14 Yet, for his part, the Indonesian 
ambassador in Jeddah has been quoted as 
saying that the embassy could not get 
involved in conflicts between Indonesian 
employees and their employers. 15 
The condition of many women now 
working as house-servants in Saudi Arabia 
was brought to public attention recently by 
Harun Lukman, chairman of the foreign 
affairs section of the Muslim association , 
Muhamadiyah . . He has received informa-
tion indicating that 80% of the women now 
working in Saudi Arabia are being badly 
treated , 16 in response to which Labour 
Minister Sudomo complained that such an 
allegation . is damaging the good relations 
between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. 
Harun Lukman also said that the 
women were being required to work all 
hours of the day and night, and many are 
being passed on from one employer to 
another. In many cases, they have to work 
from six in the morning till two the next 
morning. It is not a simple matter for 
women to report incidents to the police, as 
they are not familiar enough with Arabic. 
Many are employed in places which are 
hundreds of miles away from the Indone-
sian embassy. They are often denied per-
mission by their employers to go out, and 
in any case, it is highly unusual for women 
to be seen walking on the streets alone. If 
they ask to be allowed to return home , 
they can be required to pay their employer 
huge sums in compensation .17 In not a few 
instances, women house-servants have 
been raped by their employers , and some 
have become pregnant. For those who re-
turn home disillusioned and perhaps even 
pregnant, there is of course no reception 
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committee from the Labour Department 
waiting for them at the airport. 
The conditions experienced by Indone-
sian workers in foreign countries are hardly 
any different from working conditions in 
Indonesia . They are all part and parcel of 
the social, political and economic system in 
Indonesia. But there Is something particu-
larly pernicious about a government devot-
ing so much energy and attention to push-
ing up foreign exchange earnings from a 
form of trade which involves hundreds of 
thousands of people who are desperate to 
find jobs anywhere in the world. 
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IGGI allots $2.46 billion to Indonesia 
The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia met on 5-6 June in 
The Hague, and approved aid commitments to Indonesia for the 
corning fiscal year of $2.46 billion, an increase of around eleven 
per cent over what was pledged in 1983. This is regarded as a seal 
of approval by the donor countries for Jakarta's revised 
economic plans for dealing with the recession and reduced oil 
prices. Indonesia is proving itself ready to implement strict 
austerity measures to maintain international confidence in 
Indonesia's economic stability. Already Mrs Thatcher has 
singled out Indonesia, together with South Korea, as a country 
worthy of applause for its willingness to control expenditure, 
chiefly by slashing subsidies and re-phasing economic projects 
worth US$ 14 billion . 
Human rights were not raised during IGGI deliberations this 
year despite pressure from non-government organisations. This 
pressure which was particularly heavy in Holland, also came 
from the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group which 
compiled a 20-page dossier cataloguing violations in East Timar 
and West Papua as well as the extra-judicial killings by the 
Indonesian army's death-squads. The dossier was sent to all 
IGGI governments and called upon them to discuss these 
matters before making aid commitments. 
"Make the sack stronger to prevent any more leaks . . . " 
Sinar Harapan, 12 June 1984 
Far from heeding these requests , the IGGI member countries 
concentrated on congratulating the Indonesian regime for its 
"decisive and timely measures" to help the economy. Needless 
to say, the great majority of Indonesian people are affected by 
the austerity measures, and not by the foreign capital based 
economic growth rate. 
In spite of the praise , however , there were undercurrents of 
concern over future economic trends. It is generally considered 
desirable to use Indonesian products and services in the projects 
funded by IGGI finance, although some of the donor countries 
prefer to encourage the use of their own products and services. 
But in open international tenders, Indonesian companies are 
rarely competitive or suitable for IGGI projects, so that IGGI 
funded "development" does not help build an efficient domestic 
economic infrastructure, the measure of true development. 
Moreover, the Indonesian State Secretariat has tried to insist on 
positive discrimination for Indonesian companies, with the result 
that many projects have been seriously delayed . 
The World Bank, of which Indonesia is the second largest 
client , is also concerned that many planned government projects 
are not designed to absorb Indonesia 's vast pool of surplus 
labour, increasing by nearly two million each year. There is also 
concern over Indonesia's rising national debt , which is 
approaching a dangerously high level in relation to export 
earnings. But by the standards of most debt-ridden Third World 
countries, Indonesia is obviously satisfying the IGGI 
governments with its economic performance, at a time when the 
balance-sheet mentality dominates international economic 
thinking. The victims of death squads, in East Timor and West 
Papua, do not appear on balance sheets. 
(From Far Eastern Economic ReYiew, 19 April, 17 May, 21 June) 
Mrs Thatcher to visit 
Indonesia in September 
It has been announced that Mrs Thatcher will visit Indonesia in 
September as part of a trip to South East Asia which will also 
take her to Singapore and Malaysia. 
At the beginning of July , a senior official of the British 
Po.reign Office, Sir Crispin Tickel , Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State, paid a visit to Indonesia to discuss the results of the 
Economic Summit held in London in June . The visit took place 
as the result of a submission to the Summit by Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, acting as current 
chairman of ASEAN. The submission apparently raised matters 
connected with internatonal trade relations and the possibility of 
a new round of negotiations by GA TT to replace the "Tokyo 
Round" held several years ago. 
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